An remark about aggregations, but with no insight as to its value:
As a biologically naive lurker, it strikes me that the struggle here may be an artifact of mixing all the reasons for aggregating organisms in an observation, whereas there plenty of use cases that suit some sets of those reasons but not others. For example some aggregates are artifacts of collecting or observation methodology, e.g. lots of stuff in a vial. Some, such as on paleo specimens are a consequence of a bunch of critters being at the same watering spot when the mud came roaring down the river. Some are ecosystem entanglements. The reason underlying the aggregation might itself participate in some kinds of scientific inference but not in other kinds. For example, if a bunch of species are all in the same paleo specimen, that helps a lot with establishing the era for each of the species' presence on earth and I suppose has implications for evolutionary history. Lichens, I gather, are treated as a single individual and given a taxon name, even though for much about lichen biology it's important that there are two individuals, from different taxa, in a specimen. Etc., etc. So to me, it looks like the problem might be less in whether there are disagreements about what constitutes an individual, so much as that there are several different kinds of aggregation based on \why/ the aggregation arose. It might be \that/ is why defining 'individual' just in terms of an unadorned notion of 'aggregation' seems to lead to debates about the fitness-for-use of such a definition.
Bob Morris
John,
I'm not sure that I agree with your analysis that the definition prevents the possibility of making an Identification at a rank less specific than a species. My revised definition says that the Individual should only include groups of organisms that are reliably known to be of a single species - it doesn't say that we need to know what that species is (i.e. an identification to genus or family can be made with the hope that someone down the line would be able to refine the identification to species). Clarification on this point could be added to the comment or the Google Code page, but I don't think there is a problem with the definition per se. However, if there is a consensus that the definition is too restrictive, I would not object to changing the wording of the definition from "species (or lower taxonomic rank if it exists)" to "taxon" if there were clarification added to the comments or Google Code page that Individual was not intended to include aggregations of multiple species.
I agree that there is a need for a term that represents "collections", "bags", "aggregations", or whatever you want to call an aggregation that includes multiple species. But I have never intended that Individual should be that term. If we expand Individual to include aggregates, then it becomes unusable for its original intended purpose. I would prefer for someone to propose a different term for aggregates of individuals instead of adding that function to Individual. Then define the relationship of this new thing to Individual as a one:many relationship (one aggregation:many Individuals).
Steve
John Wieczorek wrote:Most of you probably do not receive postings from the Google Code site for Darwin Core. Steve B. updated the proposal for the new term Individual, and then commentary ensued on the Issue tracker. Since there remains an unresolved issue, I'm bringing the discussion back here by adding the commentary stream below. The unresolved issue is Steve's amendment is the restriction in the definition to "a single species (or lower taxonomic rank if it exists)."
Rich argues that we should not obviate the capability of applying an Identification to an aggregate (e.g., fossil), where the aggregate consists of multiple taxa.Steve argues that Identifications should be applied only to aggregates of a single taxon.
Steve, aside from the aggregate issue (which should be solved satisfactorily), your suggestion is too restrictive, because it would obviate the possibility of making an Identification (even for a single organism) to any rank less specific than a species. That is a loss of capability, and therefore unreasonable.
-- Steven J. Baskauf, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer Vanderbilt University Dept. of Biological Sciences postal mail address: VU Station B 351634 Nashville, TN 37235-1634, U.S.A. delivery address: 2125 Stevenson Center 1161 21st Ave., S. Nashville, TN 37235 office: 2128 Stevenson Center phone: (615) 343-4582, fax: (615) 343-6707 http://bioimages.vanderbilt.edu