<div dir="ltr">I agree with statements #1-#4... As for #5, i believe this was answered with: <a href="http://lists.tdwg.org/pipermail/tdwg-content/2013-May/003006.html">http://lists.tdwg.org/pipermail/tdwg-content/2013-May/003006.html</a><div>
<br></div><div style>John</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 8:04 PM, Richard Pyle <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:deepreef@bishopmuseum.org" target="_blank">deepreef@bishopmuseum.org</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
Hmmmm.....<br>
<div class="im"><br>
> MaterialSample doesn't necessarily have to be an occurrence and<br>
> there could possibly be multiple occurrences in a sample (or vice versa).<br>
<br>
> Thus we need the Identifier to track this (especially in the context of<br>
> DwC represented as a flat-file) <br>
<br>
</div>This is (again) 100% consistent with our interpretation of our "Individual",<br>
as I discussed previously. I don't care what the term is (I agree that<br>
"Individual is potentially vague and misleading). But whatever this "thing"<br>
is, it always includes "material", but depending on how one defines<br>
"sample", our "thing" may or may not always be sampled.<br>
<br>
Again, I don't want to re-define MaterialSample, and I don't want to<br>
obstruct it from being added to DwC. But I *do* want to make sure I<br>
understand its full meaning and scope, so I can conceptually "Venn-diagram"<br>
it against the object that we call "Individual" in our model.<br>
<br>
Let me ask a few questions (through declarative statements):<br>
<br>
1) An instance of MaterialSample may include zero, one, or many taxa<br>
represented among its material contents (zero taxa = no organisms).<br>
Correct?<br>
<br>
2) An instance of MaterialSample may represent a portion or subsample of a<br>
whole organism, may be a whole organism, or may be a set of multiple whole<br>
organisms. Correct?<br>
<br>
3) An instance of MaterialSample always represents material that is<br>
extracted from nature. (e.g., a visual observation with no material<br>
extracted from nature is not an instance of Material Sample.) Correct?<br>
<br>
4) An instance of MaterialSample may represent a subsample of (i.e., be<br>
derived from) another, more inclusive instance of a MaterialSample.<br>
Correct?<br>
<br>
5) If an instance of MaterialSample is associated with an Occurrence, it<br>
would be an Occurrence that explicitly involved that instance of<br>
MaterialSample (e.g., an Occurrence at which the MaterialSample was<br>
extracted from nature). Correct?<br>
<br>
The last one probably needs a bit more elaboration. Suppose a whole<br>
organism was observed 20 times over 10 years, representing 20 different<br>
Occurrences. On the 5th (chronologically) Occurrence, a sample was<br>
extracted from the whole organism, and we represent it as an instance of<br>
MaterialSample. I would assume that we would also establish some sort of<br>
relationship between the MaterialSample instance, and the 5th Occurrence.<br>
But would we also directly associate the MaterialSample instance with the<br>
first four Occurrences (the implication being that this sample had been part<br>
of that whole organism during those first four Occurrences)? What about<br>
directly associating the MaterialSample instance with the other Occurrences<br>
of the same whole organism that happened chronologically after the<br>
MaterialSample was extracted from nature?<br>
<br>
By "directly" associate, I mean "represent as a property of", rather than<br>
some sort of inherited property through some sort of intermediate object<br>
(e.g., the whole organism as a separate object).<br>
<br>
Don't get bogged down on this being an Edge Case, because I can come up with<br>
hundreds of other such examples, which, while perhaps being Edge Cases<br>
individually, collectively add up to non-Edge Cases in aggregate.<br>
<br>
Aloha,<br>
Rich<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br>John Deck<br>(541) 321-0689<br>
</div>